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Abstract—The U.S. Clean Power Plan stipulates a state-
specific performance-based CO2 emission standard and delegates
considerable flexibility to the states for using either a tradable
performance-based or a mass-based permit program. This paper
analyzes these two instruments when they are subject to imperfect
competition. We show that while the cross-subsidy inherent
in the performance-based instrument might effectively reduce
power prices, it could also inflate energy demand, thereby
rendering permits scarce. A dominant firm with a relatively clean
endowment under the performance-based policy would be able
to manipulate the electricity market as well as to lower permit
prices, which might worsen market outcomes compared to its
mass-based counterpart. On the other hand, the “cross-subsidy”
could be the dominant force leading to a higher social welfare if
the leader has a relatively dirty endowment.
Index Terms—electricity industry; mathematical program with
equilibrium constraints; performance-based standards
I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. federal Clean Power Plan (CPP) is introduced
by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to cut CO2
emissions from existing fossil-fuel power plants by 30%
below 2005 levels by 2030. While the proposal establishes
a state-specific target with various building blocks that lay out
possible reduction strategies, it leaves states and the power
sector with considerable flexibility in attaining their targets.
More specifically, a state can decide to adopt either 1) a
default performance-based standard under which tons of CO2
emissions per MWh of electricity generated is measured,
or 2) an equivalent mass-based standard, such as in a cap-
and-trade (C&T) regime based on GDP growth projections.
Furthermore, those states will form an alliance that allows
them to trade under either a “mass-based” or a “performance-
based” standard.
Theory suggests that the two approaches would provide
incentives that might alter a firm’s production decisions in
a very different way [2]. In particular, a “performance-based”
standard involves cross-subsidies from high-emitting sources
to low-emitting sources [9], [11]. In the case where a gen-
erating unit’s emission rate is greater than the performance
standard, it will need to pay a cost to cover its emissions,
thereby effectively elevating its marginal cost of production.
On the other hand, when a generator’s emission rate is less
than the performance standard, the negative cost becomes a
subsidy that owers its production cost, thereby making the
generator more competitive.
One emerging issue that has received little attention
is the possibility of strategic behavior under the tradable
performance-based standard as well as its repercussions for
the product market. This paper analyzes the efficiency prop-
erties of the CPP tradable performance-based standard with
considerations of ownership, heterogeneous technologies, and
transmission networks, which affect firms’ output decisions
and market outcomes. Several scenarios are considered, dif-
fering by their assumptions concerning 1) types of tradable
permit markets (e.g., mass- or performance-based standard)
and 2) whether firms possess market power in the power
and the permit markets. If firms are allowed to exercise
market power in the permit market, then a Stackelberg-type of
leader-follower formulation is considered where a leader could
fully and correctly anticipate reactions by followers, including
follower producers, system operator, and consumers.
Depending on market structure, we follow [7] and [3] in for-
mulating the problem either as a mixed linear complementarity
problem (MLCP) or a mathematical program with equilibirum
constraints (MPEC). When formulating the Stackelberg leader-
follower problem as an MPEC, the problem is challenging to
solve because of 1) complementarity conditions representing
followers’ first-order conditions so that constraint qualification
is violated and 2) bilinear terms in leader’s objective function.
We overcome these difficulties by replacing complementarity
conditions with disjunctive constraints and binary expansion,
respectively, and turn the problem into a mixed integer linear
program (MILP) [5]. While this transformation might be at
the expense of precision of the solution, the mixed integer
algorithm guarantees convergence and enables inferring the
solution quality through the duality gap.
We have following central findings of the paper. While
the cross-subsidy property of the performance-based standard
effectively reduces power prices, its inflation of the energy
demand might create scarcity in the permit market. When the
leader has a relatively clean endowment, e.g., as in California,
under the performance-based standard, its ability to manipulate
the market might worsen market outcomes compared to its
mass-based counterpart. On the other hand, when the leader
has a relatively dirty endowment, e.g., as in PJM, the “cross-
subsidy” could be the dominant force leading to a higher social
welfare compared to its mass-based counterpart.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The formu-
lation of models is given in Section II. A case analysis based
on a simplified three-node example is implemented in Section
III. We conclude the paper in Section IV.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We use a market-equilibrium approach for a single represen-
tative time period that accounts for transmission constraints,
nodal pricing, and market power. At each node, we allow
for a number of generating fleets that could be owned by
different companies. These firms compete in a pool-type power
market while subjecting themselves either to a mass- or a
performance-based policy. An independent system operator
(ISO) is assumed to maximize the usage of transmission
resources.
We consider five scenarios in our analysis by varying
choices of polices or assumptions concerning strategic behav-
ior in power and emissions permit markets. In the numerical
examples of Section III, Scenario (E) is solved first to ob-
tain the total emissions, which will be used as an effective
emissions cap for the other scenarios: (A) perfect competition
with a mass-based policy, (B) Cournot oligopoly with a mass-
based policy, (C) Cournot oligopoly with a performance-
based policy, (D) Stackelberg (leader-follower) oligopoly with
a mass-based policy, and (E) Stackelberg oligopoly with a
performance-based policy.
As alluded to earlier, we follow [7] and [3] in formulating
the problem either as a mixed linear complementarity problem
(MLCP) (Scenarios A, B, and C) or a mathematical program
with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) (Scenarios D and E).
In Sections II-A–II-B, we primarily show the formulation for
Scenario (E), i.e., Stackelberg oligopoly with a performance-
based policy. As discussed in Section II-C, we can obtain
Scenario (D), i.e., a Stackelberg oligopoly with a mass-based
policy by changing the environmental regulation. Scenarios
(B) and (C), i.e., Cournot oligopoly with either a mass- or
a performance-based policy, can be obtained from the lower-
level problem in Section II-A without the upper-level problem
in Section II-B. Furthermore, we can derive Scenario (A), i.e.,
perfect competition with a mass-based policy, by assuming
that firms are price-takers instead of Cournot players.
A. Lower-Level Problems
We here describe the lower-level problems for follower firms
and the ISO along with a market-clearing condition for CO2
allowances. The nomenclature is listed in Appendix A.
Follower firms’ problem: Follower firms (denoted by j)
maximize their profits by deciding their output level gn,j,u′
under the performance-based policy as in Eq. (1), where Dintn
and Dslpn denote the intercept and the slope of the inverse
demand curve at node n. The generation units owned by
producer j at node n are defined by u ∈ Un,j . Our formulation
is based on a standard DC load-flow model, which uses the
network transfer matrix H and the susceptance matrix B with
the voltage angle v [5], [8]. Using the definition of voltage
angles, the power flow on line ` is
∑
n∈N H`,nvn and the
imported power at node n is −∑n′∈N Bn,n′vn′ . Those firms
can affect the power price through their generation output a`



















Cn,j,u + ρ (En,j,u − F )
)]
gn,j,u (1)
s.t. gn,j,u ≤ Gn,j,u (βn,j,u), ∀n, ∀u ∈ Un,j (2)
Eq. (1) states that each follower firm dispatches its
plants across the network in order to maximize profit.










is itself a function of local generation at that node,∑
i∈I
∑
u′∈Un,i gn,i,u′ , plus net imports, −
∑
n′∈N Bn,n′vn′ .
Thus, the price at node n depends on the consumption at that
node. The operating cost not only depends on the generation
cost, Cn,j,u, but also the endogenous CO2 allowance price, ρ,
the policy rate, F , and the emission rate, En,j,u. The term
ρ (En,j,u − F ) represents a payment (revenue) if its value
is positive (negative). This problem is constrained by the
installed capacity, Gn,j,u, as indicated by Eq. (2) with the
dual variable associated with the constraint listed within the
parenthesis to the right.
ISO’s problem: The ISO maximizes social welfare in Eq. (3)
by deciding the demand, dn, and the voltage angle, vn, as in


























H`,nvn ≤ K` (µ`), ∀` (5)














Bn,n′vn′ = 0 (ν) (8)
Eq. (3) indicates that the social welfare at each node is





u∈Un,i Cn,i,ugn,i,u. Eqs. (4)–(5) state
that the transmission flow,
∑
n∈N H`,nvn, cannot exceed line
capacity of the line `, K`, while Eq. (6) defines a slack bus
to set a voltage angle equal to zero. Eq. (7) corresponds to
the energy-balance constraint at each node, i.e., consumption




u∈Un,i gn,i,u, plus net
imports, −∑
n′∈N Bn,n′vn′ , while Eq. (8) is the total energy
balance over all nodes to ensure that total generation matches
total demand in the system, i.e., the imported power is netted
out over all nodes.
Market-clearing condition for CO2 allowances: Under the
performance-based policy, the equilibrium for CO2 allowances
is expressed as a complementarity condition as follows:







(F − En,i,u) gn,i,u ≥ 0 (9)















the allowance price, ρ, is 0. Otherwise, we have a positive
allowance price, i.e., ρ > 0.
Since the problems in Eqs. (1)–(2) and (3)–(8) are convex,
they may be replaced by their KKT conditions. Consequently,
the lower-level equilibrium may be characterized as the solu-
tion to an MLCP.
B. Upper-Level Problem and MPEC Formulation
A Stackelberg leader firm maximizes its profit subject to
the lower-level problems in Section II-A. Upon replacing
the lower-level problems from Section II-A by their KKT
conditions, we can recast the leader’s problem as an MPEC














s.t. gn,s,u ≤ Gn,s,u (βn,s,u), ∀n, ∀u ∈ Un,s (11)
Eq. (9) and KKT conditions of the lower-level MLCP
where gn,s,u denotes the decision variable of leader firm s.
All the variables of the followers, including the ISO and other
producers, will be implicitly represented as functions of gn,s,u.
In practice, such MPECs are solved via reformulation as
MILPs in order to resolve non-linearities in both the objective
function (10) (i.e., stemming from bilinear terms λngn,s,u and
ρ (En,s,u − F ) gn,s,u), and Eq. (9) and the KKT conditions
of the lower-level MLCP (i.e., related to complementarity
conditions of the form 0 ≤ a ⊥ b ≥ 0) [4], [1], [5].
C. Other Formulations
We briefly discuss other formulations in Scenarios (A)–(D).
In Scenario (D), i.e., Stackelberg oligopoly with mass-based
policy, the objective functions of the leader firm in Eq. (10)








































Equations (12) and (13) imply that firms need to pay for
their emissions regardless of their emissions rates. The market-
clearing condition for CO2 allowances in Eq. (9) is also
modified as follows:







En,i,ugn,i,u ≥ 0 (14)
where F denotes the mass-based cap. Scenarios (B) and (C),
i.e., Cournot oligopolies with mass- and performance-based
policies, respectively, can be obtained from the lower-level
problem of the follower firms without the upper-level problem
for the leader firm. Furthermore, we can derive Scenario (A),
i.e., perfect competition with mass-based policy by assuming
that firms are price-takers instead of price-makers. This can
be implemented by inserting λn as the nodal price instead of
the inverse demand function and maximizing Eq. (13) with
respect to only gn,j,u.
III. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
A simple three-node network with three firms, ten gener-
ating units, and three transmission lines is used to analyze
welfare outcomes under various emission policies (Tables I–
III). This setup is sufficiently generalized as it allows firms
to own facilities and to compete across different locations.
We assume that a performance standard of 0.5 t/MW is
implemented by a regulatory agency. This level of the emission
rate is chosen such that some generating units will be either
above or below the standard. The analysis designates firm 1,
with a capacity share of more than 55%, as the leader in
the market. In effect, we are interested in comparing market
outcomes as well as welfare when the damage caused by
the emitted pollution is equivalent across scenarios. Had the
damage caused by pollution varied by different scenarios, the
welfare ranking of the scenarios could have been misleading.
TABLE I
DEMAND PARAMETERS






CHARACTERISTICS OF GENERATING UNITS
Unit Owner Location Marginal cost Emission rate Capacity
[$/MW] [t/MW] [MW]
1 3 A 38.00 0.580 250
2 1 A 35.72 0.545 200
3 2 A 36.80 0.600 450
4 1 B 15.52 0.500 150
5 2 B 16.20 0.500 200
6 3 B 0.00 0.000 200
7 1 C 17.60 1.216 400
8 1 C 16.64 1.249 400
9 1 C 19.40 1.171 450









Table IV summarizes the main results of the analysis.1
The columns from left to right correspond to Scenarios A–
E, respectively. The table comprises two parts, in which
the upper panel gives the aggregated market outcomes (i.e.,
sale-weighted prices, permit price, total emissions, consumer
surplus, producer surplus, ISO revenue, arbitrageur profit,
government revenue, social welfare, and total power sales),
and the lower panel details producer surplus by firms as
well as locational prices and sales. It is worth noting that
when calculating government revenue under the mass-based
standards, we explicitly assume that the permits are auctioned
off so that the revenue is equal to the product of the permit
price and the total emissions (= emission cap).
Several observations emerge from Table IV regarding the
overall market-level outcomes. First, the sale-weighted power
prices are lower among performance-based scenarios (C and E)
compared to their counterparts. For example, the sale-weighted
power price under Scenario E is 7.5% (or $6.5/MW) lower
than that of Scenario D. This is directly due to the cross-
subsidy under the performance-based standard that effectively
lowers the marginal cost of high-cost but low-emitting units.
Consequently, total power sales under the performance-based
scenarios are generally higher when compared to those under
their mass-based counterparts. Second, although with equal
CO2 emissions of 663.9 tons, the resulting permit prices under
the performance-based scenarios, i.e., C and E, are greater than
those in Scenarios B and D, respectively. The cross-subsidy
1All the results are based on the models presented as in Section II, which is
implemented in the modeling system AMPL and is solved via either CPLEX
(for MILPs) or PATH (for MLCPs). The problem instances are executed on
a MacBook Pro running OS X 10.7.5 with 8 GB of RAM and take about ten
minutes to four hours to solve to optimality in the case of MILPs.
effect of the performance-based standard lowers power prices,
inflates power sales, and elevates demand for tradable permits,
thereby leading to an increase in the permit price. Comparing
these scenarios, permit prices under the performance-based
policies are two to three times higher than those under the
mass-based standards.
Turning to welfare analysis, consistent with theory, perfect
competition (Scenario A) leads to the highest social welfare.
Due to the cross-subsidy by the performance-based stan-
dards, the lower power prices also result in higher consumer
surplus when comparing Scenarios E and C to D and B,
respectively. Moreover, while the theory suggests that market
outcomes under the leader-follower Stackelberg setting will
lie somewhere in between that of perfect competition and
less competitive Cournot outcomes, our results actually deviate
from that ordering [6], [12]. This is mainly because the higher
permit price under the leader-follower Scenario E somehow
offsets its beneficial effects, thereby leading to lower consumer
surplus by 6.7% compared to Scenario C. When summing over
the economic rent to calculate the social welfare, performance-
based standards perform better under the Stackelberg setting
compared to the mass-based policy. This implies that exertion
of market power under the performance-based standard could
mitigate some of the market distortion caused by firms’
strategic behavior in the product markets.
B. Relatively Clean Endowment Case
We investigate the case in which the emission rate of unit
7 owned by the leader (firm 1) is reduced from 1.216 to
0.216 t/MW. This deliberate reduction of the emission rate is
intended to create an environment that would incentivize the
leader to manipulate the permit market. Table V summarizes
the results of the sensitivity analysis with the same layout as
Table IV.
First, lowering the emission rate of unit 7 directly suppresses
the demand for permits and reduces permit prices across all
scenarios. The permit price under Scenario D (Stackelberg
leader-follower setting with the mass-based standard) even
crashes to zero, meaning that Scenario D’s total emissions
(830.6 tons) are below the cap set by Scenario E (833.7 tons).
This observation suggests that a mass-based standard might
be less susceptible than the performance-based standard to
the manipulation of the permit market by the leader. Second,
consumers would benefit from lower permit as well as lower
power prices. Third, the rank of the social welfare between
Scenarios B and E is reversed in contrast to Table IV. In
particular, the inflation of power consumption due to the cross-
subsidy under the performance-based standard (E) creates
permit scarcity that would enable firm 1 (now with a relatively
clean portfolio) to manipulate the market. This implies that
in Table IV, the cross-subsidy effect on the power price
dominates the market power effect, thereby resulting in a
higher social welfare in Scenario E. The reverse relationship
is prevalent in Table V because the market can maintain the
permit price (compared to a zero permit price in mass-based
standard in D and a marginally positive permit price in B and
TABLE IV
SUMMARY OF RESULTS UNDER THE RELATIVELY DIRTY ENDOWMENT
Scenario
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
Sale-weighted price [$/MW] 76.6 81.3 70.8 85.7 79.2
Permit price [$/t] 73.2 40.9 109.7 39.4 120.7
Total CO2 emissions [t] 663.9 663.9 663.9 663.9 663.9
Consumer surplus [$] 73,745.5 68,733.8 79,775.4 61,897.0 69,251.9
Producer surplus [$] 11,547.2 39,396.5 51,960.8 43,949.4 61,949.4
ISO revenue [$] 8,034.0 6,187.1 9,758.5 8,589.2 10,486.6
Arbitrageur profit [$] 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Government revenue [$] 48,588.1 27,160.4 0.0 26,170.1 0.0
Social welfare [$] 141,914.8 141,477.8 141,494.7 140,605.8 141,687.9
Net producer surplus [$] 60,135.3 66,556.9 51,960.8 70,119.5 61,949.4
Total sales [MW] 1,329.3 1,293.6 1,362.2 1,280.5 1,327.9
Producer surplus [$]
1 1123.0 9317.8 10,831.5 11,190.6 14,115.4
2 0.0 11,615.9 13,484.6 10,409.5 14,962.0
3 10,424.2 18,462.8 27,644.7 22,349.3 32,872.0
Price [$/MW]
A 80.7 85.8 75.3 95.8 87.5
B 52.8 61.1 44.8 57.6 47.8
C 86.2 80.4 92.4 76.7 84.7
Consumption [MW]
A 904.4 873.3 937.9 811.7 862.4
B 233.9 185.8 280.0 205.9 263.0
C 191.0 234.5 144.3 262.9 202.4
C) to the extent such that the power price remains higher under
Scenario E than that of B, thereby leading to a lower social
welfare.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has studied the impact of the mass- and
performance-based standard under imperfect competition ei-
ther in the product market only or in both the product and
the permit markets. Our analysis shows that the market equi-
librium is determined not only by the types of the standards,
i.e., mass- or performance-based, but also by market structure
as well as the asset endowment of the leader. When the
endowment of the Stackelberg leader is relatively dirty, the
performance-based standard can outperform the mass-based
standard as the cross-subsidy leads to higher consumption and
scarcer permits. Consequently, the leader’s incentive to behave
strategically in both product and permits markets is mitigated
due to the higher permit price. On the other hand, when
the endowment of the Stackelberg leader is relatively clean,
the leader will act more aggressively to extract economic
rent under the performance-based standard, thereby worsening
market outcomes when compared to the counterpart mass-
based standards. This is partially due to the fact that the lower
permit price when the leader is relatively clean cannot lower




Γ: upper-level decision variables
Ξ: lower-level primal decision variables
Ψ: lower-level dual variables
Φ: decision variables for MILP
i ∈ I: power producers
s: strategic producer index
j ∈ J : non-strategic producers2
k ∈ K: discrete generation level
` ∈ L: transmission lines
n ∈ N : power network nodes
u ∈ Un,i: generation units of producer i ∈ I at network node n ∈ N
Parameters
Bn,n′ : element (n, n′) of node susceptance matrix, where n, n′ ∈ N (1/Ω)
Cn,i,u: generation cost of unit u ∈ Un,i from producer i ∈ I at node n ∈ N
($/MW)
Dintn : intercept of linear inverse demand function at node n ∈ N ($/MW)
D
slp
n : slope of linear inverse demand function at node n ∈ N ($/MW2)
En,i,u: CO2 emission rate of unit u ∈ Un,i from producer i ∈ I at node
n ∈ N (t/MWh)
F : regulated CO2 emissions rate under performance (rate)-based policy
(t/MW)
F : regulated CO2 emissions cap under mass-based policy (t)
Gn,i,u: maximum generation capacity of unit u ∈ Un,i from producer i ∈ I
at node n ∈ N (MW)
H`,n: element (`, n) of network transfer matrix, where ` ∈ L and n ∈ N
(1/Ω)
K`: maximum capacity of power line ` ∈ L (MW)
Sn ∈ {0, 1}: dummy parameter for slack node, where n ∈ N (–)
Gn,s,u,k: discrete generation level k ∈ K of strategic producer’s unit
u ∈ Un,s located at node n ∈ N (MW)
En,s,u,k: discrete CO2 emissions associated with discrete generation level
k ∈ K of strategic producer’s unit u ∈ Un,i located at node n ∈ N (t)
Mλ,My ,M,M, Mˇ, Mˆ, M˜,M : large constants used in disjunctive con-
straints and binary expansion
Primal Variables
gn,i,u: generation at node n ∈ N by producer i ∈ I using unit u ∈ Un,i
(MW)
dn: consumption at node n ∈ N (MW)
vn: voltage angle at node n ∈ N (rad)
yn,s,u,k: strategic generator’s electricity sales revenue at node n ∈ N using
unit u ∈ Un,s at generation level k ∈ K ($)
zn,s,u,k: strategic generator’s CO2 permit revenue (or cost) at node n ∈ N
2J ∩ {s} = ∅, J ∪ {s} = I
TABLE V
SUMMARY OF RESULTS UNDER THE RELATIVELY CLEAN ENDOWMENT
Scenario
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
Sale-weighted price [$/MW] 40.8 58.8 58.5 62.3 65.1
Permit price [$/t] 2.6 0.9 0.9 0.0 19.8
Total CO2 emissions [t] 833.7 833.7 833.7 830.6 833.7
Consumer surplus [$] 131,963.0 100,706.0 101,286.0 92,313.0 88,501.2
Producer surplus [$] 30,578.7 55,038.1 55,424.8 61,382.5 63,312.7
ISO revenue [$] 1,604.7 3,869.9 3,869.9 5,169.8 5,844.8
Arbitrageur profit [$] 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Government revenue [$] 2,134.5 774.8 0.0 2,135.0 0.0
Social welfare [$] 16,6281.0 160,388.7 160,058.7 161,000.3 157,658.7
Net producer surplus [$] 32,713.2 55,812.9 55,424.8 63,517.5 63,312.7
Total sales [MW] 2,071.5 1,733.9 1,740.4 1,715.0 1,667.4
Producer surplus [$]
1 7,480.8 18,153.4 18,285.4 20,438.6 21,868.9
2 11,760.8 17,432.4 17,562.3 17,827.2 17,295
3 11,337.1 19,452.3 19,577.1 23,116.7 24,148.8
Price [$/MW]
A 55.5 67.3 66.9 81.1 82.1
B 37.7 46.6 46.2 47.8 47.8
C 19.8 48.2 47.9 38.5 44.1
Consumption [MW]
A 1059.2 986.9 988.9 902.0 895.9
B 321.6 269.8 271.7 263.0 263.0
C 690.7 477.2 479.7 550.0 508.4
using unit u ∈ Un,s at generation level k ∈ K ($)
qyn,s,u,k: auxiliary variable to linearize the strategic generator’s objective
function with respect to electricity sales at node n ∈ N using unit u ∈ Un,s
at generation level k ∈ K
pn,s,u,k: auxiliary variable used to associate CO2 permit price for the output
level of producer at node n ∈ N using unit u ∈ Un,s at generation level
k ∈ K ($/t)
Dual Variables
βn,i,u: shadow price on generation capacity at node n ∈ N for generation
unit u ∈ Un,i of producer i ∈ I ($/MW)
γn: dual for slack node n ∈ N (–)
µ`, µ`: shadow prices on transmission capacity for transmission line ` ∈ L
($/MW)
λn: market-clearing price at node n ∈ N ($/MW)
ν: hub price ($/MW)
ρ: shadow price on emissions rate ($/t)
Integer Variables
qλn: auxiliary variable used to indicate whether market-clearing price at node
n ∈ N is positive
qn,s,u,k: auxiliary variable used to discretize the strategic generator’s elec-
tricity generation at node n ∈ N using unit u ∈ Un,s at generation level
k ∈ K
rn,j,u: auxiliary variable used to handle the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
condition with respect to non-strategic producer j ∈ J ’s generation at node
n ∈ N using unit u ∈ Un,j and gn,j,u
rn: auxiliary variable used to handle the KKT condition with respect to
consumption at node n ∈ N and dn
rˇn,j,u: auxiliary variable used to handle complementarity condition between
generation constraint of non-strategic producer j ∈ J ’s unit u ∈ Un,j located
at node n ∈ N and shadow price of generation capacity
rˆ`: auxiliary variable used to handle the complementarity condition between
transmission line `’s capacity constraint and the shadow price in positive
direction
r˜`: auxiliary variable used to handle the complementarity condition between
transmission line `’s capacity constraint and the shadow price in negative
direction
r: auxiliary variable used to handle the complementarity condition between
the emissions constraint and the CO2 price
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